New technology in schools: is there a payoff? by Machin, Stephen et al.
New Technology in Schools: Is There a Payoff? 
 
 
 
Stephen Machin 
Sandra McNally 
Olmo Silva 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
January 2006 
Published by 
Centre for the Economics of Education 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AE 
 
©Stephen Machin, Sandra McNally and Olmo Silva, submitted October 2005 
ISBN 07530 1851 9 
Individual copy price:  £5 
 
The Centre for the Economics of Education is an independent research centre funded by the 
Department for Education and Skills. The views expressed in this work are those of the author 
and do not reflect the views of the DfES. All errors and omissions remain the authors.  
Executive Summary 
 
In recent years the role of investment in Information and Communication Technology 
(ICT) as an effective tool to raise educational standards has attracted growing 
attention from both policy makers and academic researchers. While the former tend to 
express enthusiastic claims about the use of new technologies in schools, the latter 
have raised concerns about the methodological validity of much of the research 
undertaken.  
The view that ICT could help to raise educational standards dates back to the 
Fifties, and builds on some of the original findings by the Harvard psychologist 
Skinner (1954, 1958). More recently, support for the effectiveness of ICT as a 
teaching and learning device comes from the educational literature. Yet results are 
generally inferred from simple correlations between ICT and pupil performance, 
without taking full account of other factors (such as school characteristics, resources 
and quality) that may be related to both ICT resources and pupil outcomes. These 
methodological short-comings cast serious doubt on the validity of most of the 
existing research which finds a positive relationship between computers (and/or 
computer software) and student outcomes. In contrast, the small number of economic 
studies that address these issues by applying more rigorous methods of analysis, 
report no evidence for a positive impact of ICT on pupil outcomes.  
In recent years, and in parallel with the widespread belief that new 
technologies account for much of the productivity resurgence in workplaces in the 
Nineties (see Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000), the UK government has motivated its 
sizable ICT investment in schools by stressing the importance of ICT in raising 
educational standards and creating opportunities for every child. The positive rhetoric 
about ICT in the UK has been backed up by considerable government investment. 
Starting from 1997, the government has encouraged the widespread use of ICT for 
teaching and learning in schools: formal plans were set-up under the ‘National Grid 
for Learning’ in order to equip schools with ICT facilities and train teachers to make 
an effective use of ICT.   Between 1998 and 2002, ICT expenditure in England almost 
doubled in secondary schools, and increased by over 300 percent in primary schools.  
In this paper, we ask whether this considerable increase in ICT investment has 
made any difference to educational standards. More specifically, we evaluate whether 
changes in ICT investment had any causal impact on changes in educational outcomes 
in English schools over the period from 1999 to 2003. To do this, we mainly rely on 
administrative data at the level of Local Education Authority. We also make use of 
detailed information contained in a survey about ICT use in English schools to help 
interpret our findings. To identify the causal impact of ICT use on pupil achievement, 
we exploit a policy change that occurred in 2001, using an Instrumental Variable (IV) 
approach. Specifically, we consider how a change in the rules governing ICT 
investment in different regions of England led to changes in ICT investment and 
subsequently changed educational outcomes. In our quasi-experimental setting, we 
identify the impact of ICT investment using the magnitude of the gain or loss 
experienced by different LEAs as a result of the change in the funding system. The 
results should be interpreted as the causal effect of ICT investment on educational 
outcomes for LEAs that were substantially affected by the change in the funding 
system over this particular time period (i.e. it is not the average effect of a change in 
ICT investment for the whole population of schools). 
Unlike previous economic studies, we find evidence for a positive causal 
impact of ICT investment on educational performance in primary schools. This is 
most evident in the teaching of English, where we also show evidence that there is 
high use of ICT for teaching purposes. We also observe a positive impact for Science, 
though not for Mathematics. Hence, in this context, there is evidence of a causal link 
between a substantial increase in ICT investment and a rise in educational standards.  
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1 Introduction 
 
Among policymakers it is widely believed that Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) investment has an important role to play in raising educational 
standards. The view that ICT can help raise educational standards dates back to the 
Fifties, and builds on some of the original findings by Skinner (1954, 1958), the 
Harvard psychologist who claimed that new technologies in schools could make 
learning dramatically more efficient. In more recent years, and in parallel with the 
widespread belief that new technologies account for much of the productivity 
resurgence in workplaces in the Nineties (see Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000), there has 
been growing interest in the use of computers in the classroom. 
In recent years the UK government has motivated its sizable ICT investment 
in schools by stressing the importance of ICT in raising standards and creating 
opportunities for every child; recently the Secretary of State for Education has spoken 
of ICT as ‘crucial to our drive to raise standards’.1 Also, it is envisaged that ICT 
should be used across the whole school curriculum. One government document 
supporting the use of ICT asserts that ‘ICT can make a significant contribution to 
teaching and learning across all subjects and ages, inside and outside the curriculum’ 
(DfES, 2003).  
The positive rhetoric about ICT in the UK has been backed up by considerable 
government investment. In 1997, the Government announced its plans to encourage 
the widespread application of ICT in teaching and learning in maintained schools 
(Ofsted, 2001). Between 1998 and 2002, ICT expenditure in England almost doubled 
in secondary schools (from an average of about £40,100 per school to just under 
£75,300 or 3 percent of overall expenditure) and increased by over 300 percent in 
primary schools (from £3,600 in 1998 to £12,900 in 2002, or about 2 percent of 
overall expenditure). 
Is this a good use of public money? Some support for the effectiveness of ICT 
as a teaching and learning device comes from both the educational literature and 
psychological research. Yet a recent review by Kirkpatrick and Cuban (1998) 
suggests that evidence for the effectiveness of ICT in schools is both limited and 
mixed. Most importantly, results are generally inferred from a positive correlation 
                                                 
1 Ruth Kelly, Speech to BETT, the annual educational technology show, London 2005. 
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between ICT and pupil performance, without taking full account of other factors (such 
as school characteristics, resources and quality) that may be related to both ICT 
resources and pupil outcomes. This gives rise to serious concerns about the validity of 
findings from such studies. Starting with the study by Angrist and Lavy (2002), there 
have been a small number of economic studies that address this issue and apply more 
rigorous methods of analysis: none of them, with exception of Banerjee et al. (2004) 
on schools in Indian urban slums, shows evidence of a positive causal relationship 
between computers (and/or computer software) and pupil performance. Thus, 
economists tend to take the opposite view to policy makers with respect to the 
efficacy of ICT investment. 
In this paper, we evaluate whether changes in ICT investment have had any 
impact on changes in educational outcomes in English schools. To do so, we mainly 
rely on administrative data (at the level of Local Education Authority) over the period 
from 1999 to 2003. To deal with potential endogeneity problems relating to ICT use 
and pupil achievement, we exploit a policy change that occurred in 2001 from which 
we devise an Instrumental Variable strategy to identify the causal impact of ICT 
expenditure. Specifically, we consider how a change in the rules governing ICT 
investment in different regions of England led to changes in ICT investment and 
subsequently changed educational outcomes. Our approach therefore identifies the 
effect of being a ‘winner’ or a ‘loser’ in the new system of ICT allocation to schools. 
Finally, we draw on insights from a school survey about ICT use in English schools. 
Unlike previous studies in the literature, we find evidence for a positive causal impact 
of ICT investment on educational performance in primary schools. This is most 
evident in the teaching of English, where we also show evidence that there is high use 
of ICT for teaching purposes.  
Our paper is structured as follows. We start in Section 2 with a brief review of 
the economic literature on computers and education. Then in Section 3, we discuss 
how ICT (i.e. mainly computers) is used in English schools and describe the changing 
policy context. In Section 4, we present an outline of the analytical framework before 
discussing results in Section 5. We draw together our conclusions in Section 6. 
 
 
 
 
 2
2 Literature on the Effect of Computers in Schools 
 
As discussed by Angrist and Lavy (2002), the educational use of computers generally 
falls under two broad headings: computer skills training, which teaches students how 
to use computers, and Computer-Aided Instruction (CAI), which uses computers to 
teach things that may or may not have any relation to technology. While basic 
familiarity with the former seems undeniably useful, the role of CAI is controversial. 
The theoretical case for CAI is not well developed and there are reasons to think 
computers in the classroom may be a distraction and displace other, more effective, 
teaching techniques. 
Some empirical support for the effectiveness of CAI comes from both the 
educational and psychological literature. There are many qualitative studies which 
summarize the overall impression of people participating in CAI demonstration 
programs; many others attempt some quantitative analysis, but often do not have a 
suitable comparison group of non-CAI users. A recent review of the international 
evidence is provided in Kirkpatrick and Cuban (1998). The authors conclude that the 
evidence for the effectiveness of ICT in schools is limited and mixed. They also cast 
some doubt on the methodological approach of existing studies.  
Evidence for the English experience in recent years is mainly reported in 
Becta (2002), Ofsted (2001) and in other government reports. According to Ofsted 
(2001) ‘there is evidence of a link between high standards across the curriculum and 
ICT use in schools’. Similarly, Becta (2002) concludes that ‘differences in attainment 
associated with greater ICT use were clearly present in National Tests or GCSEs’.2 
Unfortunately, as for most of the studies reviewed by Kirkpatrick and Cuban (1998), 
results are generally inferred from a positive correlation between ICT and pupil 
performance. However, the use of computer and teaching software may well be 
correlated with other inputs to education which are unobserved or imperfectly 
measured. Neglecting factors that contemporaneously affect performance and 
technology may lead to biased estimates of the influence of CAI on pupil 
achievement. This gives rise to serious concern about the validity of findings. 
This problem is well illustrated in the recent study by Fuchs and Woessman 
(2004), which uses international data from the Programme for International Student 
                                                 
2 GCSE is General Certificate of Secondary Education, the exams taken in the final year of compulsory 
schooling at age 15/16. 
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Assessment (PISA). They show that while the bivariate correlation between the 
availability of computers at school and school performance is strongly and 
significantly positive, the correlation becomes small and insignificant when other 
school characteristics are taken into account. However, as they acknowledge, their 
estimates do not necessarily show the causal effect of computers on pupil 
performance if there are other important omitted variables. Establishing whether 
computers have a causal impact requires experimental or quasi-experimental 
evidence, where a ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ group can be properly defined. 
Angrist and Lavy (2002) is the first such study in this vein. They use the fact 
that the Israeli State lottery funded a large-scale computerization effort in many 
elementary and middle schools to facilitate a controlled comparison between schools 
that received funding and schools that did not receive funding. They find no evidence 
that increased educational use of computers raised pupil test scores. In fact, with 
regard to 4th grade Maths scores, they find a consistently negative and marginally 
significant relationship between the programme-induced use of computers and the 
outcome measure.  
Leuven et al. (2004) also use a government scheme - this time in The 
Netherlands - to evaluate the effect of computers (and software) on pupil outcomes in 
a quasi-experimental setting. They find that the extra funds for computers and 
software do not have a positive impact on pupils' achievement, and even seem to have 
a negative effect on language and Maths scores. From a survey of schools, the authors 
infer that funding was not used to purchase computer hardware (where needs seem to 
have been satisfied), but to buy new software or invest in Internet connections. 
Similarly to Angrist and Lavy (2002), they conclude that instruction methods using 
computers may be less effective than other instruction methods. 
Goolsbee and Guryan (2002) analyze the effect of a program in the US to 
subsidize schools' investment in Internet and communications. They do not have a 
quasi-experimental setting, but they try to isolate the program's effect from underlying 
trends by exploiting a threefold strategy: first, they exploit cross-sectional variation in 
the subsidy rate across schools in the same time period; secondly, they look at growth 
rates rather than at levels; and thirdly, they include a detailed set of controls in their 
analysis. Although the program led to an increase in Internet connections, they find no 
impact on any measure of pupil achievement. 
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Rouse et al. (2004) present results from a randomized study of a popular 
instructional computer program designed to improve language and reading skills in 
the US. Their estimates suggest that while the use of computer programs may improve 
some aspects of students' language skills, these gains do not translate into a broader 
measure of language acquisition or into actual reading skills. The authors argue that 
their study is a strong test of the educational benefit of computer software since the 
program they evaluate (FastForWord) is on the leading edge of scientifically-based 
computer technology in schools and one of the more expensive programs available.  
An important exception to the body of work that reports no effects is Banerjee 
et al. (2004). Their analysis is in a very different setting and presents the results of a 
randomized policy evaluation administered in Mumbai and Vadodara (India), aimed 
to improve the quality of education in urban slums. The authors find that a computer 
assisted program, designed to reinforce mathematical skills, had a large and positive 
impact on math scores; but the program did not produce positive spillovers to other 
subjects. Although these results can hardly be compared to findings from other studies 
based on developed countries, the authors are the first to show (in a causal sense) that 
CAI may have the potential to help disadvantaged children improving their 
educational achievements. 
In summary, the small number of studies to date that address the ‘endogeneity’ 
issue find little evidence of a positive relationship between the use of computers 
and/or computer software and educational performance. In some cases there may even 
be a negative relationship. The main conclusion is therefore that the use of CAI in 
schools to teach language and mathematical skills is not effective on average (and 
certainly not cost-effective); in fact, it may be inferior to teaching methods that are 
being replaced by technology. If this is true, then the policy emphasis on using ICT to 
teach subjects across the curriculum is misplaced and it would be better to divert 
investment from ICT into an aspect of education where there is evidence of positive 
returns. In the remainder of this paper, we consider these important, policy relevant 
issues for the English school system. 
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3 ICT in English Schools 
 
In 1997 the UK government announced plans to encourage the widespread application 
of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) to teaching and learning in 
maintained schools.3 The intention was to equip schools with modern ICT facilities; 
create a National Grid for Learning (NGfL) containing educational information and 
study material; and organize a program of in-service training for teachers and school 
librarians to enable them to make effective use of ICT in their professional work 
(Ofsted, 2001). A target for the computer-pupil ratio was set, where the aim was to 
achieve a target of 1:8 in primary schools and 1:5 in secondary schools by 2004. 
Throughout this period, funds were distributed to schools through their Local 
Education Authorities (LEAs).4 Between 1998/99 and 2000/01, the main government 
funding was channeled to LEAs through an ‘Infrastructure and Services’ grant (also 
known as the NGfL grant). From 2000/01 onwards, there was an extra component 
(about 16-20 percent of the total) aimed at connecting schools to Broadband. The 
increase in the funding over time was considerable, rising from £102 million in 
1998/99 to £349 million in 2002/03. Trends over time are shown in Figure 1, which 
shows average ICT funding (upper panel) and ICT funding per pupil (lower panel) for 
LEAs.  The Figure displays a dramatic increase in resources from 2000 onwards (i.e. 
the Financial Year 1999/2000). 
Using information from the ‘ICT Survey of Schools in England’, we show 
how this translated into ICT use in schools in 2000 and 2003.5 The Survey is an 
annual assessment of schools in England, where about 25 percent of secondary 
schools and about 6 percent of primary schools are surveyed about ICT use and 
funding. Although schools participating in the survey constitute a representative 
sample of English schools in terms of key characteristics,6  ICT expenditure per pupil 
                                                 
3 Maintained schools refer to all non-private sector schools in the UK; these are funded by Local 
Education Authorities, largely from central government grants. 
4 There are 150 Local Education Authorities in England. They are responsible for the strategic 
management of local authority education services including planning the supply of school places, 
ensuring that every child has access to a suitable school place, intervening where a school is failing its 
pupils and for allocating funding to schools. 
5 We adopt the convention that the school or financial year 1999-2000 is known as ‘2000’ (to 
correspond to the time at which examinations take place). The school year starts in September whereas 
the Financial Year starts in April. The difference in timing should not be a problem as it is unlikely that 
spending between April and June would affect pupil performance in summer examinations (May/June). 
6 We have checked the representativeness of schools in the Survey in terms of size, pupil 
characteristics, pupil/teacher ratio and student achievement. 
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is higher on average than the LEA figures would suggest. For example, in 2003, 
primary and secondary schools spent £56 per pupil and £68 per pupil respectively. In 
contrast, specific ICT funding per pupil (shown in Figure 1) was £47 per pupil at this 
time. The main reason for this difference is that schools may also use general school 
funding (i.e. non-ICT specific) for their ICT expenditure. In fact, in the ICT survey 
for 2000 and 2002, schools were asked how much of their ICT expenditure came from 
the source of funding shown in Figure 1. On average, for primary and secondary 
schools, this was about 20 and 12 per cent respectively in 2000; these shares went up 
to 45 and 29 per cent in 2002.7 This shows that ICT-specific funding has become 
more important as a source of school-level ICT expenditure in recent years (especially 
for primary schools).  Also, schools in the ICT survey were already well resourced in 
terms of ICT in 2000, before the major increase in ICT-specific investment. For 
example, the computer/pupil ratio is quite close to the (2004) government target in 
2000 at 1:10 in primary schools and 1:7 in secondary schools. 
Nevertheless, for the schools in the sample, Table 1 shows quite sizeable 
changes over a relatively short period. By 2003, the computer/pupil ratio was 1:6 in 
primary schools and 1:4 in secondary schools. All the indicators of ICT use in the 
classroom show fairly high percentage increases in this short time period – this 
includes: ICT expenditure per pupil; the computer/pupil ratio; the percentage of 
teachers using ICT regularly in their teaching; the percentage of teachers trained to 
use ICT (and those who have recently updated their training). For both primary and 
secondary schools, internet coverage was universal in 2003 (from a high base in 
2000). Although secondary schools were better equipped with ICT in 2000, the 
greatest relative increase over time was experienced in primary schools. Also, it is 
notable that ICT is used regularly for teaching purposes in a much higher percentage 
of primary schools than secondary schools: in 2003, ICT was reported to be used 
regularly for teaching in 92 per cent of primary schools, as compared to 55 per cent of 
secondary schools.8 Hence, one might expect any effect of ‘computer-aided 
                                                 
7 For 2000 and 2002, we have checked whether ICT expenditure per pupil coming from ICT-specific 
funding is consistent in the school surveys with what the administrative data suggests (net of funding 
for Broadband connectivity, which does not go directly to schools). We find that schools in the ICT 
survey report a lower allocation from this source than what we might expect. This may be due to 
reporting errors by schools or retention of resources at LEA level to fund coordinated activities (such 
as training). However, the rise in ICT expenditure from ‘ICT specific’ funding is broadly consistent at 
the school and LEA level, being above 200% between 2000 and 2003. 
8 This is based on the following two questions: ‘How many teaching staff are employed in the school at 
present?’; ‘How many teaching staff use computers on a regular basis?’ 
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instruction’ on educational performance to be more evident in primary schools than in 
secondary schools.  
In Table 2, we show the share of ICT expenditure spent on various items in 
2000 and 2002 (the only years where this question was asked). It is interesting to note 
that the share of ICT expenditure devoted to hardware and software decreased by 14 
and 3 per cent in primary and secondary schools respectively whereas the share of 
resources devoted to teacher training rose by 57 per cent for primary schools and by 
50 per cent for secondary schools. This suggests that the extra funding may have 
improved the quality of ICT use in schools (through teacher training) rather than 
simply increase the amount of ICT equipment.  
Figure 2 provides additional information about the use of ICT in schools. 
Specifically, it depicts the proportion of schools where ICT is ‘substantially used’ in 
the teaching of particular subjects for a pooled sample of schools in the ICT Survey 
between 2000 and 2003 (when this question was asked). For any particular subject, 
ICT is used ‘substantially’ in at least 20 per cent of schools at both primary and 
secondary level (except for some subjects in primary school, such as music, design 
and foreign languages - which may not be taught in all primary schools or at least not 
very formally). The non-ICT subject where ICT is most often used according to this 
categorization is design in secondary school, and then English at primary school. 
About 65 percent of primary schools report that they ‘substantially use’ ICT in the 
teaching of English. The next most important ‘ICT user’ is Maths (followed by 
Science), where ICT is ‘substantially used’ in about 56 percent of primary schools and 
40 percent of secondary schools. Thus, a relevant question is whether all this intensive 
use of computers as an instructional method has an observable impact on pupils' 
educational outcomes. 
 
3.1 The ICT funding mechanism 
Government grants for ICT funding are distributed to schools via their Local 
Education Authorities (LEAs). To obtain this source of funding, LEAs must agree to 
match any ICT-specific funding with general education funding (also provided by 
central government - but not ring-fenced for ICT). Hence, to some extent, school-
level funding for ICT depends on the importance attached to ICT by the LEA. The 
administrative data for ICT funding (as shown in Figure 1) reflects both components 
of the ICT grant. 
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In the years 1999 and 2000, funding for ICT was allocated to LEAs through a 
bidding process. Anecdotal evidence from the Department for Education and Skills 
suggests that the aim was to direct money towards LEAs that were proposing 
innovative and interesting ways to manage the roll-out of the government programme 
discussed above. Almost all LEAs received ICT funding, but its level was related to 
the degree of interest in their proposal. From 2001 onwards, there was an important 
change in the allocation mechanism - the rationale being to make the system more 
equitable. From then on, allocations were made according to a formula based on 
school and pupil numbers in LEAs. For a component of the grant (i.e. that relating to 
Broadband connectivity), there was also an adjustment made for population density. 
The change in the allocation mechanism created winners and losers among 
LEAs. LEAs which had benefited a lot under the old system stood to lose from the 
transition to a formula-based system, and vice versa. In Figure 3, we plot the log share 
of total ICT funding received by each LEA before and after the policy change. We 
also plot the corresponding ‘fitted share’ of ICT funding, which is based on pupil 
numbers, school numbers and population density in the LEA. After the policy change 
the correspondence between the actual and fitted share is close. Before the policy 
change, there is considerable divergence between the actual and fitted share - showing 
that allocations to LEAs were not made on the same basis before and after the policy 
change.9 Hence some LEAs gained from the new system, whereas others lost - and the 
magnitude of the gain or loss can be estimated by the difference between the share of 
funding received by the LEA in the new system relative to the share of funding it 
received in the old system.  
The key features of the policy change that are important for the analysis are as 
follows: the basis for the funding allocation was different in the new system and the 
old system; the change created ‘winners’ and ‘losers’; the change was not pre-empted 
by LEAs in how they were bidding for funding the year before the rule change (this 
seems very unlikely. Furthermore, the funding share in the two pre-change years, 
1999 and 2000, is very highly correlated). In our analysis, we use the magnitude of 
gain or loss as a result of the change in system, combined with the timing of the 
change, to predict changes in ICT funding at LEA level. We argue that this provides 
                                                 
9 There is very little change over this time period between LEAs with respect to components of the 
formula (school and pupil numbers). So, the observed differences between fitted and actual shares in 
2000 and 2001 do not reflect major changes in the characteristics of LEAs. They effectively capture the 
shift in the allocation of ICT funds induced by the new allocation system. 
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an exogenous source of variation in ICT funding that can be used to analyze the 
relationship between ICT investment and educational outcomes, thus overcoming 
potential endogeneity problems. 
A further illustration of the effect of the rule change in 2001 can be seen in 
Figure 4, which shows trends in ICT funding per pupil (indexed at 1 in 1999) over 
time for two groups of LEAs: those which were at or below the 25th percentile of the 
ICT expenditure per pupil distribution in 1999; and those which were at or above the 
75th percentile. The consequence of the rule change in 2001 was that these two groups 
became much closer in terms of per pupil ICT funding from that time onwards. 
Among these two groups, the relative ‘winners’ were those LEAs at the lower part of 
the distribution in 1999 and 2000. 
In Tables 3 and 4, we also use the ICT school survey to examine how schools 
in these two categories of LEAs fared between 2000 and 2003, in terms of their ICT 
inputs. Table 3 shows statistics for primary schools. In terms of ICT expenditure per 
pupil and the computer-pupil ratio, primary schools in ‘top LEAs’ (i.e. those at or 
above the 75th percentile of the distribution in 1999) do not look different from those 
in ‘bottom LEAs’ (i.e. those at or below the 25th percentile of the distribution in 
1999). However, as would be expected from the large relative increase in government 
funding to the latter LEAs, the rate of increase in most school-level indicators is 
considerably higher in ‘bottom LEAs’ than in ‘top LEAs’. This pattern is far less clear 
for secondary schools (in Table 4). The rate of increase in ICT expenditure per pupil 
is only slightly higher for schools in ‘bottom LEAs’ relative to ‘top LEAs’ and the 
rate of increase in the computer-pupil ratio is lower in ‘bottom LEAs’. This may 
reflect the fact (discussed above) that for secondary schools ICT expenditure per pupil 
has not increased over time as much as in primary schools and ring-fenced ICT 
funding appears to be less important as a source of overall ICT expenditure.10  
 
 
4 Analytical Framework and Identification 
 
The key issue is to identify the relationship between ICT investment and educational 
outcomes, while taking account of any other confounding factors. To overcome the 
                                                 
10 There are no rules for how LEAs allocate ICT funding to schools: ‘they have the freedom to manage 
allocations at a local level in order to meet local priorities’ (DfES, 2004). 
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endogeneity problem, we make use of the quasi-experimental setting provided by the 
change in the funding allocation mechanism to implement an Instrumental Variable 
Strategy.  
Because our identification strategy is based on a rule change at LEA level, we 
rely on data at this level of aggregation. We construct an LEA-level panel using 
administrative data over the 1999-2003 period.11  Information includes ICT funding; 
pupil performance; other LEA funding to schools; and LEA characteristics, such as 
the number of schools and pupils. We know that the rule change created ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ among LEAs, and that the magnitude of gain or loss can be estimated 
from the difference between the share in overall expenditure received by the LEA in 
the year prior to the policy change and the share after the policy change.12 Hence, our 
first-stage regression is based on the following key relationship: 
itittiitit XIndexC ωθφξλ +∆+++=∆ ≥2001  (1)
where  is the change in log(ICT funding per pupil) for LEA i in time t; 
 is a measure of ‘gain’ or ‘loss’ incurred by LEA i as a consequence of the 
change in the allocation mechanism in the years after the change (t≥2001); 
itC∆
2001≥itIndex
iξ  is an 
LEA fixed effect potentially capturing its relative position in the ICT funding 
distribution, before the policy change; tφ is a set of year fixed effects;  is a vector 
of changes in inputs (in logs) expected to affect ICT funding per pupil at the LEA-
level; and 
itX∆
itω  is an error term.   
Our second stage regression can be written as follows: 
itittiitit XCY εγδαβ +∆+++∆=∆  (2)
where  is the change in pupil outcomes (in logs) in LEA i at time t; itY∆ iα and tδ  are 
LEA and year effects respectively; itX∆  is the same vector of changes in other inputs 
expected to affect pupil outcomes at the LEA-level; and itε  is an error term.  
Controlling for LEA effects ( iξ  and iα ) is potentially important in our 
analysis as being a ‘winner’ or a ‘loser’ from the rule allocation change (reflected 
                                                 
11 There are also various data constraints at school-level - for example, we need to rely on retrospective 
information to construct the change in the computer/pupil ratio for schools. We do not have 
retrospective information on ICT expenditure per pupil. The school-level surveys are based on a 
repeated cross-section, where relatively few have been sampled more than once. 
12 It does not make much difference whether we use 1999 or 2000 data to calculate the share of ICT 
funding allocated to a particular LEA. There is a strong correlation between the shares allocated to 
LEAs in both these years. 
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in  itself) may be correlated with other LEA-specific characteristics, which are 
in turn correlated with both computer funding and pupil outcomes. This might happen 
if LEAs that were particularly good at extracting ICT funds in the bidding process 
(i.e. pre-policy) for educational purposes were also good for their schools in other 
ways. Crucially, it is  interacted with a dummy for the period in which the 
policy is in place Policy-on (i.e. for the post-change years, ) that is used for 
identification, and not  itself. We therefore control for LEA effects in our IV 
strategy using  as a regressor in both the first and second stage of the 
regression.
iIndex
iIndex
2001≥itIndex
iIndex
iIndex
13 Our identification strategy is similar to the non-linear IV approach 
followed by Angrist and Lavy (2002).14
One might ask whether instrumenting for the change in ICT funding is really 
necessary when estimating regressions at LEA level. For example, there is exogenous 
variation in the growth of ICT funding as this is largely determined by central 
government. Furthermore, with such aggregate data, unobserved attributes of pupils 
or schools that are correlated with the growth of ICT funding and with educational 
outcomes may not be so important. There are two main reasons for an IV approach in 
this context. Firstly, the measure of ICT funding is only a proxy for ICT investment at 
school-level. In Section 3, we have described how ICT-specific funding is just a 
fraction of overall ICT expenditure in schools. The fact that we may be measuring 
changes in the true ICT input with error could lead to downward bias in our estimate 
of the effect of ICT investment on educational outcomes.15
Secondly, because LEAs must provide matched funding to ‘ICT-specific’ 
funding, the level of LEA funding (and relevant school expenditure) will reflect the 
extent to which LEAs prioritize ICT as a source of funding. This adds a further non-
random dimension to ICT funding observed at LEA level, which may be correlated 
with educational outcomes. If LEA priorities change over time, this effect will not be 
removed with the inclusion of LEA fixed effects. In Table A1 of the Appendix, we 
                                                 
13 We also experimented with more flexible and non-parametric alternatives. First, a full battery of 
LEA dummies (fixed effects) was used in both stages. When this was done, the same point estimates 
were obtained, although standard errors were slightly larger; yet, this only marginally affected the 
significance of the estimated coefficient. Alternatively, we included polynomials (up to the fourth 
power) of Indexi; point estimates and the significance of our results were fully confirmed. 
14 In their study, schools applying for ICT grants are ranked within city, and actual funding is a non-
linear and non-monotonic function of the rank. This relation forms the basis for an Instrumental 
Variable approach, which is valid when controlling for parametric functions of the rank itself. 
15 Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) show that this problem is exacerbated in a panel context. 
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show some evidence that ICT funding is ‘crowding out’ other types of LEA funding, 
since there is a negative relationship between ICT funding per pupil and other LEA 
funding per pupil. However the instrument used in our regressions is completely 
unrelated to non-ICT funding per pupil at the LEA level.  
There is therefore a strong rationale for instrumenting the change in ICT 
funding, even when analyzing relationships at the LEA level. We then identify an 
average causal response (ACR) of educational achievement to changes in the funding 
mechanism. The ACR is defined by Angrist and Imbens (1995) and is a generalization 
of the local average treatment effect (LATE) when the treatment is not binary. In our 
case, the treatment intensity varies between LEAs, and is proportional to the losses or 
gains experienced by LEAs as a result of the change in the funding mechanism. 
Therefore, ACR will depend on the distribution of treatment intensities across LEAs: 
big ‘losers’ or big ‘winners’ from the change in system will have a disproportionate 
effect on the IV estimate. We will return to this point later, when discussing the 
interpretation of our findings. 
 
 
5 Results 
 
5.1  First stage regressions 
Regressions are based on administrative data at LEA level for the years 1999-2003. 
All variables are specified in log changes, except for , its interaction with the 
timing of the policy change, Index*Policy-on (i.e., ), and a sparsity factor 
(constant over time). The first stage regression is shown in Table 5. In column 1, we 
show the relationship between the instrument and the change in ICT funding per pupil 
controlling for Index
iIndex
2001≥itIndex
i.  Then in column 2, we also include controls for variables used 
to allocate ICT funds to LEAs in the post-reform period (sparsity; pupil numbers; 
school numbers) and controls for the pupil-teacher ratio and non-ICT funding per 
pupil, as well as a set of year dummies. The key parameter of interest is the estimated 
coefficient on Index*Policy-on, which is positive and highly significant in both 
specifications. The reported F statistics are well above the critical values suggested in 
Staiger and Stock (1997) to detect weak instruments; also, the marginal R-squared for 
the excluded instrument suggests Index*Policy-on can account for a large proportion 
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of the variation observed in the growth rate of ICT after the policy change.16 Finally, 
an interpretation of the coefficient is that if the rule change led to an increase of about 
10 percent in the relative share of ICT funding received by an LEA, this would mean 
a 9 percentage point increase in ICT funding per pupil within that LEA. 
 Although our identification strategy exploits the interaction Index*Policy-on 
and the exogeneity of the date of the policy change, we also test for the balancing 
properties of Indexi itself; this provides additional information about the validity of 
our identification strategy. To do so, we study whether there is any relation between a 
number of observable characteristics of LEAs before the period under analysis and 
Indexi. Results from this exercise are reported in Table A2 (in the Appendix to this 
paper), where we show simple correlations and regression results. If the changes in 
the allocation of ICT expenditure induced by policy reform are independent of long-
run LEA trends and characteristics, we expect to find little relation. This is clearly the 
case, as shown in Table A2, and thus provides additional evidence as to the validity of 
our strategy.  
In Table 6, we estimate similar specifications at the school-level since it is 
important to know whether the instrument has some power at this level, and to see 
whether the impact is different for primary schools than for secondary schools. In this 
case, the dependent variable is the computer-pupil ratio and is based on retrospective 
data in the ICT Survey (where schools are asked about the number of computers used 
for teaching at the present time and three years previously; similar questions are not 
asked about ICT expenditure). Some additional school-level controls are included 
(percentage of students eligible for free school meals; percentage of students with 
Special Educational Needs). The instrument is positive and significant for primary 
schools in both specifications, though much less powerful than in regressions 
specified at the LEA level.17 In this case, a 10 percent increase in the share of ICT 
funding received by an LEA  leads to an increase in the computer-pupil ratio of about 
0.13 percentage points.18 In contrast, the estimated coefficient is zero when estimating 
                                                 
16 Notice that we only have one exclusion restriction and, since the level of variation in the dependent 
variable and in the excluded instrument is the same, the F statistic is asymptotically equivalent to the 
square of the t statistic on Index*Policy-on. 
17 In this specification, the dependent variable varies at the school level, while the instrument is fixed 
within LEAs. As a result, the F statistic is not asymptotically equivalent to the square of the t statistic 
on Index*Policy-on. This helps in explaining the much weaker explanatory power of our exclusion 
restriction in the school level models as compared to the LEA models reported earlier. 
18 The estimated coefficient at the school level is very different to that at the LEA level. Apart from the 
fact that the measure of ICT is different, there are a number of possible reasons for this: schools only 
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the regression for secondary schools. Given the discussion in Section 3, it is not 
surprising to see that the IV strategy has no power in this case. Hence, in the second 
stage of our analysis, we focus exclusively on primary school outcomes.  
 
5.2 The effect of ICT funding on educational outcomes 
In England, compulsory education is organized into 4 Key Stages (1-4) and national 
tests (which are externally set and marked) are taken at the end of each Key Stage for 
pupils of age 7, 11, 14 and 16 respectively. The test at age 11 is taken at the end of 
primary school (Key Stage 2). Marks for each test are converted into a level on a scale 
of 2-6, where ‘level 4’ is the standard deemed appropriate at this stage of education. 
The educational knowledge and skills required at each level are set out in the National 
Curriculum. Government targets for pupils of age 11 are based around the percentage 
of pupils that attain ‘level 4’. Hence, this is the measure of performance recorded in 
the School Performance Tables and used in our analysis (at LEA level). 
In Tables 7 to 9, we report results from LEA-level regressions, where the 
outcome variables measure examination performance at age 11 in English, Maths and 
Science respectively. 19  Table 7 shows three specifications where the dependent 
variable is the proportion of students attaining level 4 or above in English at Key 
Stage 2. In column 1, we show the OLS results. In columns 2 and 3 we show results 
from IV regressions, controlling for Indexi (column 1) and then adding all other 
controls (column 2).  The OLS regression shows no relationship between ICT funding 
per pupil and performance in English. In contrast, the IV regressions show a positive 
and significant relationship between ICT funding per pupil and performance in 
English, which is not sensitive to whether controls are included. The coefficient 
shows that a doubling of ICT funding per pupil in schools led to a 2 percentage point 
increase in the proportion of pupils achieving level 4 or above in English at age 11. 
As discussed above, changes in ICT funding of this magnitude really did happen for 
primary schools over this period and the impact on performance in English is notable 
given that the average growth rate of pupils' scores in this subject was around 7 
percent between 1999 and 2003. However, the causal effect of ICT identified here is 
                                                                                                                                            
partly rely on ICT-specific (i.e. NGfL) funding for ICT-related expenditure; only a fraction of ICT 
expenditure is used to buy computers; the LEA may use ICT-specific funding to finance joint activities 
(e.g. teacher training); the change in computers per pupil is computed over two periods, while our 
instrument is mainly capturing changes occurring between 2000 and 2001.  
19 For school-level regressions, the instrument is much weaker in the first stage. Hence IV estimates are 
very imprecisely determined in the school-level regressions.  
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not the average population effect (i.e. for all schools in England) but rather the causal 
effect of large changes in ICT investment for LEAs that were substantially affected by 
the rule change.20  
In Table 8, similar regressions are shown, where performance in Mathematics 
is the dependent variable. In this case, the relationship between ICT funding per pupil 
and the measure of performance is positive, but insignificant, with the estimated 
coefficients being less than half the size of the estimated effect for English. Finally, in 
Table 9, results show no relationship between ICT funding and performance in 
Science for the OLS regressions. However, the coefficient is positive and significant 
in the IV regressions. In this case, a doubling of ICT funding per pupil leads to an 
increase of 1.4 percentage points in the proportion of pupils achieving level 4 or 
above.  
 
5.3 Robustness 
Some issues remain to be discussed. First, as shown in the Figures discussed earlier, 
our IV strategy is more binding for the years immediately before and after the change 
in the rules for the allocation of ICT funds. An important question is therefore: how 
are results affected if we apply the IV strategy to the model in Equation (1) over the 
years 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 only? Secondly, although the policy change 
profoundly altered the distribution of ICT funding between 2000 and 2001, it might 
have taken some time to gain full impact; it is therefore important to determine 
whether the impact of ICT on educational achievement grew over time, after the 
policy change.  
We address these points in Table 10. The first row reports the impact of ICT 
on educational achievement, when only the 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 window is 
considered; the second and third rows respectively report results comparing 1999-
2000 to 2001-2002, and 1999-2000 to 2002-2003, thus allowing the policy to take 
some time to produce its full effect. 
Results for English are reported in the first column. We find a positive and 
significant effect of ICT, even when we confine our attention to the immediate 
aftermath of the policy change: the estimated impact is 0.013, and significant at the 1 
percent level. Also, the comparison of 1999-2000 with subsequent periods (2001-
                                                 
20 As described above, we identify the Average Causal Response. This gives more weight to LEAs that 
were substantially affected by the rule change.  
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2002 and 2002-2003) suggests the policy change took some time to produce its full 
effect. 
As for Science, the estimated impact over 1999-2000 and 2000-2001 is 
significantly reduced; in fact, the IV estimates in Table 9 mainly capture an effect of 
the policy emerging in the period 2002-2003, which is estimated to be as large as that 
for English. Finally, we still do not find any positive impact of ICT on Maths scores. 
 
5.4 Interpretation of the findings 
Evidence discussed so far suggests that, in the English context, where the policy 
change in 2001 induced large changes in the ICT funding received by primary 
schools, ICT expenditure has led to significant improvements in school performance 
in English and Science tests at age 11, though not for Maths. How can we reconcile 
our evidence with previous studies in the field that find no effect? 
The IV estimates presented in this paper identify the average causal response 
(ACR) of educational achievement to changes in the funding mechanism. ACR is a 
generalization of the Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) when the treatment is 
not binary (see Angrist and Imbens, 1995), and depends on the distribution of 
treatment intensities across LEAs, with big `losers' or big `winners' disproportionately 
affecting the IV estimates. In fact, we know that for big 'winners', defined as those 
LEAs in the top quartile of our Indexi distribution, the average growth rate of ICT 
funds was roughly 60 percent after the policy change (i.e. over 2001-2003); this 
contrast with a much smaller change of 20 percent for big 'losers', i.e. LEAs in the 
bottom quartile of the Indexi distribution (see Figure 4). Intuitively, it is the 
comparison between these two groups, and the associated change in the allocation of 
ICT funds, that drives identification of the impact of ICT on educational outcomes.  
To further illustrate this interpretation, we implement the method developed in 
Angrist and Imbens (1995), which allows identification of those LEAs that 
contributed most to the estimates of the ACR, in terms of acceleration in their ICT 
funding. To keep it as simple as possible, we make use of a binary version of our 
instrument; this takes the value one when Indexi  is positive or zero (i.e. for 
‘winners’), and the value zero when Indexi  is negative (i.e. for ‘losers’). Our IV 
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results are fully confirmed when this version of the instrument is used, with the 
impact of ICT expenditure on Science rising to above 0.20.21  
ACR estimates should be interpreted as the weighted average impact of a 1 
percent change in the growth rate of ICT funding, for LEAs affected by the policy 
change; for each level of the growth rate of ICT funding, say j, the weighting function 
is proportional to the fraction of LEAs that went from ICT funding below j to ICT 
funding above this level, as a result of the policy change. So, which LEAs are 
weighted more in our ACR estimates? 
A simple and informative answer can be provided graphically, analyzing the 
cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of the growth rate of ICT separately for 
winners and losers (as defined by whether Index is positive or negative), after the 
policy change; computations are carried out over the common support of the ICT 
funding.22 Results are depicted in the top panel of Figure 5.23 The difference between 
the two CDFs, at each point j of the ICT funding distribution, is a function capturing 
the contribution (i.e. the weight) of that point to the ACR estimate; this is plotted in 
the bottom panel of Figure 5, with associated standard errors. 
The graph indicates that LEAs significantly contributing to the ACR are those 
with growth rates of ICT expenditure between 50 percent and 70 percent, and up to 80 
percent. For example, around 8 percent of the LEAs obtained 65 percent growth rates 
of ICT funding in the years after the policy change, whereas they would have 
obtained less in the absence of the shift; similarly, about 5 percent of the LEAs 
experienced a growth of between 75 and 80 percent in ICT funding as a result of the 
introduction of the new policy. These are the observations that contributed most to the 
estimation of the ACR discussed above, suggesting that our IV strategy mainly 
captures the impact of large changes in ICT investment on primary school 
performance. 
 
 
                                                 
21 Yet the estimates based on a continuous version of Indexi come from our preferred specification. In 
fact, a continuous measure of winners and losers is much better designed to control for LEA 
characteristics, which may spuriously affect the relationship between school performance and ICT 
funding.  
22 As a result, part of the bottom tail of the distribution for losers, and of the top tail of the distribution 
for winners, are trimmed out of the sample. 
23 Note that the fact that we observe no significant crossing of the CDFs also speaks in favour of the 
monotonicity assumption required for our strategy to identify a causal impact of ICT on educational 
outcomes. 
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6 Conclusion 
 
It is difficult to establish the causal relationship between computers and educational 
outcomes because of the ‘endogeneity’ problem. There are only a small number of 
studies in the economic literature which attempt to address this issue.  With the 
exception of the rather different Banerjee et al. (2004) paper on schools in Indian 
urban slums, they all find no evidence of a positive relationship between computers 
(and computer related inputs) and educational performance. In this study, we examine 
the issue in an English context, where there has been a major increase in information 
communication technology (ICT) investment since 1998.  
We examine the relationship between changes in ICT investment and changes 
in educational performance in Local Education Authorities (LEAs). We overcome the 
‘endogeneity’ problem by making use of a change in the rules about how ICT funds 
were allocated to different LEAs. Hence, we follow studies that use a quasi-
experimental setting to estimate the effect of a given treatment status. In this case, the 
‘treatment’ is measured continuously and reflects the magnitude of the gain or loss 
experienced by different LEAs as a result of the change in the funding system. In 
contrast with most previous studies in the economic literature, we find evidence for a 
positive impact of ICT investment on educational performance in primary schools. A 
positive effect is observed for English and Science, though not for Mathematics.  
Hence it seems that, in a context where there was a significant expansion of ICT 
investment, one can uncover evidence of an improvement in pupil achievement linked 
to ICT.  This provides an interesting parallel, both to the existing work that does not 
find beneficial effects for pupils and to the related work on firms where there is 
evidence that ICT investment enhances firm productivity. 
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 Table 1  Trends in ICT Expenditure and Use of ICT resources;  
Primary and Secondary Schools. 
 
 Primary Schools Secondary Schools  
 99/00 02/03 % 
Change 
99/00 02/03 % 
Change 
Prim.-Sec.,  
99/00-02/03 
ICT Expenditure 
per Pupil (£)  
41 
 
56 
 
+37 60 
 
68 
 
+13 
 
+24 
 
Computers per 
Pupil 
0.10 0.16 +60 0.15 0.23 +53 +7 
% Using ICT 
Regularly 
75 92 +23 38 55 +45 -22 
% Trained to Use 
ICT  
81 95 +17 75 83 +11 +6 
% Recently 
Updated Training 
57 85 +49 48 69 +44 +5 
% Schools 
Connected to 
Internet 
86 100 +16 99 100 +1 +15 
 
Notes: Outlier schools have been excluded (schools in the top or bottom 1% of the distribution of either computers 
per pupil or expenditure per pupil). Number of primary schools: 627 in 1999/2000; 810 in 2002/2003. Number of 
secondary schools: 616 in 1999/2000; 714 in 2002/2003.  
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Table 2  How was ICT money spent in schools? Percentage devoted to different 
items. 
 
 Primary Schools 
 1999/2000 2001/2002 % Change 
Hardware 63 53 -16 
Software 10 10 +0.0 
Internet + TLC 8 7 -12 
Training 7 11 +57 
Technical Support 9 13 +44 
Administration + Other 3 6 +100 
 Secondary Schools 
 1999/2000 2001/2002 % Change 
Hardware 57 55 -3.5 
Software 9 9 +0.0 
Internet + TLC 4 3 -25 
Training 4 6 +50 
Technical Support 14 17 +21 
Administration + Other 12 10 -17 
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 Table 3  Expenditure and Use of ICT resources, before and after the policy; ‘top 
LEAs’ vs. ‘bottom LEAs’, Primary Schools 
 
 Primary Schools 
 Top LEAs Bottom LEAs  
 99/00 02/03 % 
Change 
99/00 02/03 % 
Change 
Bottom-Top, 
99/00-02/03 
ICT Expenditure 
per Pupil (£) 
41 54 +32 40 63 +53 +21 
Computers per 
Pupil 
0.10 0.16 +60 0.10 0.17 +70 +10 
% Using ICT 
Regularly 
71 90 
 
+27 78 
 
93 
 
+19 -8 
% Trained to Use 
ICT  
84 94 
 
+12 79 
 
93 
 
+18 +6 
% Recently 
Updated Training 
61 
 
86 
 
+41 55 
 
85 
 
+54 +13 
% Schools 
Connected to 
Internet 
89 100 +12 78 100 +28 +16 
 
Notes: LEAs ranked by per pupil ICT funding; ranking fixed in 1998/1999. Outlier schools have been excluded 
(schools in the top or bottom 1% of either the computer per pupil or expenditure per pupil distributions). The number 
of schools in top LEAs is 191 and 229 in 1999/2000 and 2002/2003 respectively. The number of schools in bottom 
LEAs is 189 and 203 in 1999/2000 and 2002/2003 respectively. 
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Table 4  Expenditure and Use of ICT resources, before and after the policy, ‘top 
LEAs’ vs. ‘bottom LEAs’, Secondary Schools 
 
 Secondary Schools 
 Top LEAs Bottom LEAs  
 99/00 02/03 % 
Change 
99/00 02/03 % 
Change 
Bottom-Top,  
99/00-02/03 
ICT Expenditure 
per Pupil (£) 
64 70 +9 59 66 +12 +3 
Computers per 
Pupil 
0.15 0.23 +53 0.16 0.23 +44 -9 
% Using ICT 
Regularly 
38 
 
55 
 
+45 38 57 
 
+50 +5 
% Trained to Use 
ICT  
75 
 
81 
 
+8 75 88 
 
+17 +9 
% Recently 
Updated Training 
50 
 
68 
 
+36 52 
 
75 
 
+44 +8 
% Schools 
Connected  to 
Internet 
99 100 +1 98 100 +2 +1 
 
Notes: LEAs ranked by per pupil ICT funding; ranking fixed in 1999/2000.  Outlier schools have been excluded 
(schools in the top or bottom 1% of either the computer per pupil or expenditure per pupil distributions). The number 
of schools in top LEAs is 167 and 190 in 1999/2000 and 2002/2003 respectively. The number of schools in bottom 
LEAs is 183 and 188 in 1999/2000 and 2002/2003 respectively. 
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Table 5  Instrumental Variable Strategy; First Stage LEA Regressions 
 
 ∆Log(ICT Funding per Pupil) 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS 
Index*Policy-on 0.894 0.913 
 (0.078)** (0.078)** 
Index -0.556 -0.593 
 (0.080)** (0.077)** 
Sparsity  0.120 
  (0.029)** 
∆Log(Pupil/Teachers)  0.030 
  (0.566) 
∆Log(Number of Pupils)  -0.077 
  (1.055) 
∆Log(Number of Schools)  0.413 
  (0.363) 
∆Log(LEA School Expenditure/Pupils)  0.682 
  (0.170)** 
Constant 0.009 -0.121 
 (0.028) (0.032)** 
Year Dummies  YES YES 
Observations 591 591 
R-squared 0.62 0.64 
F-Test on Excluded Instrument 131.99 136.33 
R-squared on Excluded Instrument 0.30 0.32 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Index 
is an LEA based indicator defined as fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 1999/2000. 
Regressions are  weighted by number of pupils in the LEA. 
 
 25
Table 6  Computers per Pupil; Power of the Instrument at school-level 
 
 ∆Log(Computers per Pupil) 
 Primary Schools Secondary Schools 
 (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) OLS 
Index*Policy-on 0.013 0.011 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.003) (0.004) 
Index   -0.003 -0.007 -0.010 -0.009   
 (0.003) (0.002)** (0.003)** (0.004)** 
Sparsity  0.018  -0.007 
  (0.005)**  (0.005) 
∆Log(Pupil/Teachers)  -0.007  -0.011 
  (0.005)  (0.011) 
∆Log(Number of Pupils)  -0.056  -0.072 
  (0.007)**  (0.018)** 
∆Log(% Special Needs Pupils)  0.002  -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001) 
∆Log(% Free Meals Eligibility)  -0.000  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Constant 0.042 0.047 0.067 0.073 
 (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.002)** 
Year Dummies YES YES YES YES 
Observations 3613 3355 3920 3848 
R-squared 0.28 0.32 0.32 0.33 
F-Test on Excluded Instrument 9.11 9.35 0.81 0.86 
R-squared on Excluded Instrument 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 
 
Notes: Index is an LEA based indicator defined as fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 
1999/2000. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%. Outlier schools have been excluded (schools in the top or bottom 1% of either the computer per pupil 
or expenditure per pupil distribution). ICT variable comes from ICT School Survey. Other school-level 
variables come from the School Performance Tables and the Annual School Census. 
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Table 7  Change in proportion of students obtaining Level 4 or above in KS2 
English and LEA per Pupil ICT Spending 
 
 ∆Log(Proportion of Level 4 or above, KS2 English) 
 (1) OLS (2) IV (3) IV 
∆Log(ICT Funding per Pupil) 0.001 0.020 0.020 
 (0.004) (0.006)** (0.006)** 
Index -0.002 -0.004 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
∆Log(Pupil/Teachers)   0.023 
   (0.055) 
∆Log(Number of Pupils)   0.142 
   (0.119) 
∆Log(Number of Schools)   -0.035 
   (0.036) 
∆Log(LEA School Expenditure/Pupils)   -0.029 
   (0.015) 
Sparsity   -0.022 
   (0.004)** 
Constant 0.065 0.066 0.075 
 (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.004)** 
Year Dummies  YES YES YES 
Observations 591 591 591 
R-squared 0.63 0.60 0.62 
 
Notes: Index is an LEA based indicator defined as fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 
1999/2000. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%.  Regressions are weighted by number of pupils in the LEA. 
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Table 8  Change in proportion of students obtaining Level 4 or above in KS2 
Mathematics and LEA per Pupil ICT Spending 
 
 ∆Log(Proportion of Level 4 or above, KS2 Maths) 
 (1) OLS (2) IV (3) IV 
∆Log(ICT Funding per Pupil) 0.001 0.007 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
Index -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
∆Log(Pupil/Teachers)   -0.073 
   (0.050) 
∆Log(Number of Pupils)   -0.016 
   (0.113) 
∆Log(Number of Schools)   -0.077 
   (0.038)* 
∆Log(LEA School Expenditure/Pupils)   -0.001 
   (0.013) 
Sparsity   -0.011 
   (0.004)** 
Constant 0.042 0.042 0.044 
 (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)** 
Year Dummies  YES YES YES 
Observations 591 591 591 
R-squared 0.57 0.57 0.58 
 
Notes: Index is an LEA based indicator defined as fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 
1999/2000. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%.  Regressions are weighted by number of pupils in the LEA. 
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Table 9  Change in proportion of students obtaining Level 4 or above in KS2 
Sciences and LEA per Pupil ICT Spending 
 
 ∆Log(Proportion of Level 4 or above, KS2 Sciences) 
 (1) OLS (2) IV (3) IV 
∆Log(ICT Funding per Pupil) 0.002 0.016 0.014 
 (0.003) (0.008)* (0.007)* 
Index -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 
 (0.002)* (0.002)* (0.002) 
∆Log(Pupil/Teachers)   -0.067 
   (0.047) 
∆Log(Number of Pupils)   -0.038 
   (0.116) 
∆Log(Number of Schools)   0.030 
   (0.041) 
∆Log(LEA School Expenditure/Pupils)   -0.011 
   (0.016) 
Sparsity   -0.018 
   (0.004)** 
Constant 0.082 0.082 0.088 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004)** 
Year Dummies  YES YES YES 
Observations 591 591 591 
R-squared 0.76 0.75 0.76 
 
Notes: Index is an LEA based indicator defined as fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 
1999/2000. Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 
1%.  Regressions are weighted by number of pupils in the LEA. 
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Table 10  IV Estimates and Achievements: One Period Impact and Time-to-
Build Policy Effects 
 
 (1) English (2) Maths (3) Sciences 
One Period Impact  0.013 0.005 0.006 
(1999-2000 vs. 2000-2001) (0.005)** (0.004) (0.004) 
    
Time to Build Effect, 2 Periods  
after Policy Change 
0.025 -0.005 0.017 
(1999-2000 vs.2002-2003) (0.012)* (0.010) (0.012) 
    
Time to Build Effect, 3 Periods  
after Policy Change 
0.030 0.019 0.029 
(1999-2000 vs.2002-2003) (0.011)** (0.010) (0.015)* 
    
Year Dummies  YES YES YES 
Other Controls YES YES YES 
Observations 295 295 295 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Regressions are weighted by number of pupils in the LEA. 
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Figure 1  Trends in ICT funding; LEA level 
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Figure 2  Use of ICT by Subject. 
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Notes: Data are averaged over the period 1999/2000-2002/2003. Intensity of use by main subject; statistics 
represent percentages of teachers substantially using computers and ICT support in their classes. 
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Figure 3 ICT funding Actual and Fitted, before and after the policy 
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Notes: the three bottom LEAs have been dropped from the graphs; the excluded LEAs are “Corporation of 
London” (LEA 201), “Isle of Scilly” (LEA 420) and “Rutland” (LEA 857). These LEAs always rank at the very 
bottom (they have very few schools); all regressions results are robust to their exclusion. 
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Figure 4  ICT per pupil funding for ‘top LEAs’ (at or above the 75th percentile) 
and ‘bottom LEAs’ (at or below the 25th percentile) of the ICT distribution in 
1999 
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Notes: LEAs ranked by ICT funding per pupil; ranking fixed in 1998/1999. 
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Figure 5  Impact of the Instrument and Average Causal Response (ACR) 
Interpretation 
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Notes: Instrument is binary version of Index; equals 1 for Winners (positive values of Index); equals 0 for Losers 
(negative values of Index). Growth rates expressed in percentage points/100 (1=100%). CDFs and Difference in 
CDFs computed over the common support of ICT funds per pupil, for treated and non-treated. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1  Is ICT Funding Crowding out other LEA funding? 
 
 ∆Log(LEA Funding per Pupil)  
-net of ICT- 
∆Log(ICT Funding per Pupil) -0.034  -0.024 
 (0.011)**  (0.010)** 
Index*Policy-on  -0.069 -0.043 
  (0.048) (0.051) 
Index  0.052 0.035 
  (0.041) (0.043) 
∆Log(Pupil/Teacher) -0.281 -0.251 -0.297 
 (0.154) (0.157) (0.156) 
∆Log(Number of Pupils) 2.848 2.635 2.762 
 (0.554)** (0.541)** (0.547)** 
∆Log(Number of Schools) -0.063 -0.024 -0.058 
 (0.111) (0.111) (0.107) 
Sparsity -0.030 -0.036 -0.032 
 (0.016) (0.015)* (0.016)* 
Constant 0.090 0.082 0.087 
 (0.005)** (0.004)** (0.004)** 
Year Dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 591 596 591 
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.09 
 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the LEA level in parentheses; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. 
Index is an LEA based indicator defined as fitted log share of ICT funding minus actual log share, in 2000. 
Regressions are weighted by number of pupils in the LEA. 
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Table A2  Descriptive Statistics and Balancing Properties of the Instrument 
 
Dependent Variable (1) Descriptive 
Statistics  
(2) Correlation  
with Instrument 
(3) Regression  
on Instrument 
% Achieving ≥ level 4, English; 
growth rate 97-98 
0.033 
(0.040) 
-0.172 -0.017 
(0.010) 
% Achieving ≥ level 4, Maths; 
growth rate 97-98 
-0.057 
(0.050) 
0.026 0.003 
(0.011) 
% Achieving ≥ level 4, Science; 
growth rate 97-98 
0.006 
(0.039) 
-0.061 -0.006 
(0.008) 
% Achieving ≥ level 4, English; 
growth rate 97-98 
0.024 
(0.059) 
0.137 0.021 
(0.018) 
Permanent Exclusion 
Index, 1999 
0.300 
(0.154) 
-0.129 -0.048  
(0.034) 
Total Number of  
Crimes, 1999 
14534.42 
(9384.33) 
-0.077 -1760.07 
(2281.61) 
Number of Teen 
Pregnancies, 1999 
274.45 
(178.02) 
0.028 12.433 
(38.840)  
Mean Household  
Income, 1999 (thousand of £) 
21.515 
(3.794) 
0.062 0.573 
(0.604)  
Total Number of Young 
Unemployment Claimants, 1999 
655.60 
(521.74) 
-0.069 -87.187 
(122.40) 
 
Notes: Column 1 presents averages of various dependent variables and standard deviations in parentheses. Column 2 
reports pair-wise correlations between dependent variables and Index. Column 3 presents regression coefficients from 
separate regressions of the dependent variables on Index and a constant; standard errors in round brackets. 
Correlations and regression coefficients not significant at conventional levels. 
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